We present two case studies in formal reasoning about untyped λ-calculus in Coq, using both first-order and higher-order abstract syntax. In the first case, we prove the equivalence of three definitions of α-equivalence; in the second, we focus on properties of substitution. In both cases, we deal with contexts, which are rendered by means of higher-order terms (functions) in the metalanguage. These are successfully handled by using the Theory of Contexts.
Introduction
In this paper we present two case studies stemming from two well-known encoding paradigms of languages with binders in Logical Frameworks: firstorder and higher-order abstract syntax (FOAS and HOAS, respectively). In the former case, we can choose between de Bruijn indexes or explicit names, but in both cases the treatment of binders is problematic: using de Bruijn indexes is a daunting task and difficult to understand (e.g., 600 technical lemmata for two binders in [9] ). On the other hand, the use of explicit names charges the user with the burden of encoding the mechanism of α-equivalence. As we will see, from the point of view of computer aided proof development, this represents a non-trivial task, since α-equivalence is often taken for granted without an explicit axiomatization. Usually only a short definition is given in natural language, followed by some examples [1] . Actually, α-equivalence can be defined rigorously in more than one way; for instance, besides the "conventional" one [1] , there is the variant used by McKinna-Pollack [15] , and Gabbay-Pitts' alternative, based on the notion of variable transposition [6, 7] . It is therefore natural to show formally that these three definitions are really equivalent. 1 Research supported by the MURST Project tosca.
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Following the higher-order approach, instead, binders are represented by means of higher-order constructors. Therefore, α-equivalence is automatically given by the metalanguage of the logical framework. In a type theory without native support for inductive types, like the Edinburgh LF, the natural choice for representing the "λ" binder is a full HOAS constructor of type (Λ → Λ) → Λ; this would allow us to delegate also substitution to the metalanguage [8] . However, if we want to take advantage of the inductive features of a metalanguage like CIC, we cannot resort to a full HOAS approach, because constructor types like (Λ → Λ) → Λ violate the positivity condition of inductive types. Hence, we are forced to introduce a separate type for variables with the consequence that capture-avoiding substitution of terms for variables is no more delegated to the metalevel (weak HOAS). Moreover, the latter cannot be defined naïvely as a recursive function, but only as a relation. This raises questions about its properties, such as functionality (determinism and totality), composition, etc.
Recently, in order to deal with (meta)theory of nominal calculi, the authors have proposed a set of axioms called the Theory of Contexts [11] , stemming from the technique originally used in [12] for formally deriving in Coq [13] the metatheory of strong late bisimilarity of the π-calculus. These axioms reflect at the theory level some fundamental properties of the intuitive notion of "context" and "occurrence" of variables. Their informal meaning is the following:
Unsaturability of variables: no term can contain all variables; i.e., there exists always a variable which does not occur free in a given term; In this paper, we apply the Theory of Contexts for dealing formally with the issues above. More precisely, as far as the FOAS encoding is concerned, we formally prove that the three alternative definitions of α-equivalence are indeed equivalent; as far as the HOAS enconding is concerned, we prove the functionality of the substitution relation. We will see that in both cases the Theory of Contexts allows for a smooth treatment of the basic notion of renaming, when this is rendered through the functional application of the underlying metalanguage.
In conclusion, the Theory of Contexts turns out to be a powerful tool for metareasoning on nominal calculi not only if these are encoded in HOAS, but even in the case of a plain, first-order approach with explicit names.
Synopsis. In Section 1 we briefly recall the untyped λ-calculus. Then, in Section 2 we give a first-order encoding of the object language, we describe and encode the three notions of α-equivalence we take into account and we formally prove their equivalence by means of the Theory of Contexts. In Section 3 we present a higher-order encoding of untyped λ-calculus and of capture-avoiding substitution, with a formal development of the related metatheory. Final conclusions are in Section 4. The Appendix is devoted to a brief introduction to the Calculus of Inductive Constructions and to the Coq proof assistant.
1 The object language Λ The set Λ of untyped λ-terms is defined by the following grammar: . The notion of "free variables" (F V ) and "variables", both free and bound, (V ) are defined as usual. For X a finite set of variables, we define
we denote Λ ∅ . For an introduction and a comprehensive development of the theory of the λ-calculus, see [1] .
First-Order Abstract Syntax approach
As a first case study, we will address the problem of encoding three notions of α-equivalence: the "conventional" one given in common textbooks on λ-calculi (see, e.g., [1] ), a variant used in a previous formal study of the metatheory of λ-calculus [15] , and an alternative formulation proposed in [6] . We are not interested here in taking a HOAS-based approach in encoding the syntax of the object language. Otherwise, α-equivalence would be provided for free by the metalanguage of the logical framework and would not be accessible at the object level.
Due to lack of space, we cannot present all the results of the complete development; we refer the interested reader to [21] .
Encoding of syntax
The first-order representation of the syntax of Λ is the following:
Parameter Var: Set. Inductive tm : Set := var : Var -> tm | app : tm -> tm -> tm | lam : Var -> tm -> tm.
It should be noticed that Var is not an inductive set. The only terms which can inhabit Var are variables of the metalanguage, which represent directly the variables of the object language. In fact, Var is not required to be inductive by the definition of the syntax of Λ, so there is no reason to bring in unnecessary assumptions, i.e., the induction and recursion principles. Actually, these unwanted principles are not harmless, because they can be exploited for defining exotic terms. Moreover, they are inconsistent with the properties of the Theory of Contexts we are going to use (see [12] for the details). For X = {x 1 , . . . , x n }, throughout the paper we will denote by Γ X the typing environment given by {x1 : Var, . . . , xn : Var}∪{dij :˜(xi = xj) | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n}. Moreover, in the remaining of this section Λ X will denote the set {M | M ∈ Λ, V (M ) ⊆ X} (differently from Section 1). Finally tm X will represent the canonical forms M (i.e. βη-head normal forms) of type tm such that Γ X Σ Λ M : tm. The adequacy of the given encoding is stated by the following proposition, which is a conseguence of [11] Theorem 1 and can be proved using a standard inductive argument:
The Theory of Contexts for Λ in FOAS
As the type Var is concerned we assume that the equivalence between names is decidable: Axiom dec: (x,y:Var)x=y \/~x=y.
In order to introduce the remaining axioms of the Theory of Contexts, we need to define the non occurrence predicate: The intuitive meaning of (notin x M) is that the variable x does not occur (neither free nor bound) into M. The definition is completely driven by the signature, following the general pattern of [12, 11] . The second axiom about the type Var is the unsaturation property:
As a technical remark, we notice that it is possible to derive unsat from a more "general" unsaturation property which is independent from the peculiar syntax of the object language (var list is the type of (finite) list of variables and notin list is the predicate allowing to express the non occurrence of a variable in a list):
Axiom unsat_list: (l:var_list)(Ex [x:Var](notin_list x l)).
The lack of higher-order constructors in tm allows us to derive the axiom of β-expansion (for plain terms) by means of a structural induction on M: Notice that monotonicity axiom has not been cited in the Introduction. Actually, if we assume unsaturability also at the level of contexts, this property could be derived by induction over the terms using the other axioms of the Theory of Contexts.
Encoding of α-equivalence (I)
We take as a starting point the following definition taken from [1] : Intuitively, (change var x y M N) holds if and only if the term N is the result of replacing each occurrence (free or bound) of x with y into M. More formally, the following result states the adequacy of change var w.r.t. the predicate whose inference rules are depicted in Figure 1 .
Changing a variable in a λ-term.
Soundness: if there exists t such that
Proof. Easily proved by means of Proposition 2.1 and by induction on the structure of the normal forms (Soundness), and induction on the structure of the derivation of the variable-changing judgment (Completeness). 2 However, changing a variable "blindly" (i.e., without checking if the new one is fresh) by means of change var could yield the problem of capturing occurrences of variables which were free before performing the replacement. For example, let us consider the term (lam x (app x y))= ε x,y (λx.xy), then we can derive (change var y x (lam x (app x y)) (lam x (app x x))) which corresponds to the following equation "on paper":
The free occurrence of y into λx.xy has been captured once replaced by x, while the λ-terms λx.xy and λx.xx are not α-equivalent. Hence, we must be sure that, when replacing a variable in a λ-term, the new one is fresh. The encoding of freshness is carried out by means of the notin predicate we have introduced in Section 2.2: The first three constructors are congruence rules, the fourth one is the change of bound variables rule, while the last one is transitivity (recall that two terms can differ by one or more changes of bound variables).
Proposition 2.4 (Adequacy of alphaBar)
Proof. Also this result can be proved straightforwardly using the same technique specified in Proposition 2.3. 2
Thanks to the previous adequacy theorem, alphaBar can be regarded as a specification which the subsequent definitions we are going to investigate must fulfill in order to faithfully represent the notion of α-equivalence.
Encoding of α-equivalence (II)
In [15] an alternative encoding of α-equivalence is proposed; translating it in terms of our representation of the λ-calculus, we obtain the following definition:
The first two constructors (alphaMKP var and alphaMKP app) are congruence rules, while the alphaMKP lam constructor states that, in order to establish the equivalence of λx.M and λy.N , we must pick a fresh name z (not occurring at all in M and N ) and prove that
We formally proved the equivalence of alphaBAR and alphaMKP:
Lemma ALPHABAR_ALPHAMKP: (A,B:tm)(alphaBar A B)->(alphaMKP A B). Lemma ALPHAMKP_ALPHABAR: (A,B:tm)(alphaMKP A B)->(alphaBar A B).
Both lemmata are proved by structural induction on the derivation of the premise. The second proof is trivial, while the first requires, as a preliminary result, to prove the transitivity of ALPHAMKP. In order to derive it we followed the approach pioneered in [15] .
Encoding of α-equivalence (III)
In [6] , the α-equivalence relation is proved to be equivalent to the binary relation ∼ defined by the rules depicted in Figure 2 (where (a b)·(−) stands for the operation of variable-transposition). As observed in [6] , variable-transposition is an operation more basic than other notions of renaming (e.g. textual and The reason is that (notin context y M) and (notin context y N) do not necessarily imply (notin y (M x)) and (notin y (N x')) (while the vice versa is true by the monotonicity axiom). Hence, we cannot use the name y provided by the induction hypothesis, but we must pick a completely fresh variable in order to make the conclusion.
3 High-Order Abstract Syntax approach
In this section, we adopt a well-known higher-order representation of λ-calculus, using a separate type for variables (weak HOAS). It follows that we cannot define substitution as a recursive function, but only as a relation. We will prove that this relation is indeed functional. Due to lack of space, we cannot present all the results of the complete development about this encoding; we refer the interested reader to [17] . Declaring var as a coercion allows us to inject implicitly terms from type Var into tm, so that in the following this constructor may be omitted from terms.
Formalizing the syntax
As in the FOAS encoding, we do not define Var as an inductive set in order to be able to prove the adequacy of the representation and to avoid inconsistencies with the Theory of Contexts.
Notice that lam is a higher-order constructor, that is it takes a functional term as argument. In particular, terms of type Var->tm represent exactly the capture-avoiding contexts of the λ-calculus. This technique allows to inherit the α-equivalence on terms from the metalanguage, and still to have an inductive definition for terms. At the same time we can define functions by first-order recursion or case analysis on the syntax of terms.
The adequacy of this encoding, already proved in [17] , is a consequence of [11, Theorem 1] . For X = {x 1 , . . . , x n } a finite set of variables, recall that
Proposition 3.1 For all X finite set of variables, there is a bijection ε X between Λ X and tm X . Moreover, this bijection is compositional, in the sense that if
As a corollary, a (capture-avoiding) context M [·] ∈ Λ X is naturally encoded as [z:Var]ε X,z (M (z)), where the fresh variable z acts as a "placeholder" for the hole. In fact, a bijection like in Proposition 3.1 can be established between contexts and terms of type Var->tm.
Formalizing substitution
As for α-equivalence, capture-avoiding substitution is not always defined in full detail. Typically it is intended to be a (parametric) function ·[N/x] : Λ → Λ recursively defined on the syntax of terms, for instance as follows.
It is important to notice that, in order to have a total function, this definition has to be taken up-to α-equivalence. This means that in the case of λ-abstraction, when y is exactly x, there is a "silent" (i.e., hidden) conversion of (λy.M ) into (λz.M [z/y]), where z can be chosen arbitrarily fresh. Thus, the definition of captureavoiding substitution which is usually intended is not deterministic a priori, since it requires an arbitrary α-conversion of bound variables of the context in order to avoid capturing free variables in the substituted term. More complex languages (e.g., dynamic logic, Hoare logic [16] ) may require nonstandard substitutions involving contrived notions of conversion, not simply α-conversion.
Capture-avoiding substitution could be entirely delegated to the metalanguage of a Logical Framework, if we used a full HOAS encoding. In such approach, there would be no specific type Var for variables, and the λ constructor would be rendered simply as lam : (tm -> tm) -> tm. Therefore, a context would be represented as a map of type tm -> tm, and thus substitution becomes the application of the context to the substituting term. However, full HOAS encodings are not compatible with inductive definitions of Coq, because they do not satisfy the positivity condition, which (roughly) requires that the type we are defining (tm) does not occur in negative position in the type of any argument of any constructor. For this reason, we have resorted to a weak HOAS encoding, as the one above. A drawback of this solution, however, is that we cannot delegate the substitution to the metalanguage anymore. Instead, we need to define it by hand, as a parametric relation between contexts and terms in a logic-programming style (as in [5] 
Representing the substitution in CIC as a relation gives raise to the possibility that it may be not total, that is for some N, M there is no M such that
The fact that such a definition does give a functional (i.e., deterministic and total) relation is a property which we are going to prove explicitly using the Theory of Contexts.
The Theory of Contexts for Λ in HOAS
Given the signature of the syntax, the Theory of Contexts is composed by two parts. The first contains the definitions of "occurrence" predicates. These definitions are immediately derived from the signature of the language, following the pattern in [12, 11] . The only thing we need to know about names (variables), is that equality over Var is decidable. However, we do not need a full blown classical logic: it is sufficient to have a classical behaviour on the occurrence check predicates.
Axiom LEM_OC: (M:tm)(x:Var)(isin x M)\/(notin x M).
This implies to the decidability of (eq Var). . This has been used several times in the development of the metatheory of π-calculus [12] . On the other hand, it has not been needed in the present work on Λ. A possible motivation is that here we allowed for higher-order induction, while in [12] we had to recover it from induction over plain, first-order terms.
(Meta)Theory of Substitution

Determinism of substitution
The property we want to prove is the following: We give two proofs of this property. The first goes by induction on the derivation of (subst N M M1). This gives rise to four cases:
subgoal 2 is: (y)=M2 subgoal 3 is:
(app M1' M2')=M0 subgoal 4 is:
each of which should be dealt by inverting the hypothesis H (or corresponding). Usually, such an inversion would eliminate automatically all absurd cases, but this does not work when the terms which have to be discriminated are higherorder. This is indeed the case, since the second argument of subst has type Var->tm. The Inversion H tactic gives us four cases for the first goal, only one of which is trivially true and the other are absurd: Absurd cases are (tediously) eliminated by using the Theory of Contexts, in particular the axiom of extensionality. The whole proof is 95 lines long, most of which deal with the elimination of absurd cases.
Determinism of substitution, again
A much shorter proof can be obtained by proving a suitable higher-order inversion lemma for substitution. In Coq, inversion lemmata are automatically synthesized and proved on-the-fly from recursion principles by the Inversion tactic, using the algorithm originally implemented by Murthy with subsequent elaboration by Cornes and Terrasse [4] . However, this algorithm fails to give the right inversion predicate when the datatype, which we have to discriminate over, is higher-order, because usual inductive type theories do not recognize a higher-order type as inductive. Nevertheless, we know that types of the form Var->tm do have recursion principles [10, 2, 11] . Hence, we can consistently introduce these principles (as Axioms) for the definition of the recursive map needed in the inversion predicate: Then, the higher-order inversion principle is "mechanically" claimed and proved as follows: Using this inversion lemma, the proof of determinism of substitution is much easier (12 lines). In fact, we "lift" at the level of context the syntactic machinery of inversion tactics that Coq provides at the level of terms.
Totality of substitution
The proof of totality is tricky due to some peculiarities of CIC. The lemma we want to prove is Lemma subst_is_total : (M:Var->tm)(EX M' | (subst N M M')).
Our intent is to prove this by higher-order induction over M. This fails in the case of the lambda abstraction, which appears as follows: The suitable term should be obtained from the hypothesis H. However, Coq does not allow us to eliminate a Proposition (like H) to build a term in a Set (M' in tm). Such "eliminations of strong Σ-types" may lead to inconsistencies, and hence are ruled out by the type theory CIC [3] .
The solution we adopt is to move the whole proof in the Set realm, and then to lift the result to Prop. Therefore, we introduce a Set-typed version of the induction principle-which, equivalently, can be seen as a recursor with The soundness of such a principle can be established by porting to dependent types the model construction in [10, 2] .
Then, we prove the totality in Set by higher-order dependent recursion: Notice that in the case of lambda, the required term is built by eliminating (projecting) the Σ-type in the hypothesis H instantiated on a locally bound (and hence, fresh) variable y. Then, the totality theorem is just the extraction of the logical part from the Σ-type (sit M):
Of course, the application of the function subst_f cannot be actually reduced, since the recursor tm_rec1 is an axiom and hence has no computational content. However, it is possible to "realize" it by means of an external ML program, which goes "under the hood" of Coq by discriminating between variables and abstractions. In such a case, subst_f would be the full-fledged capture-avoiding substitution one has in mind.
An interesting property of substitution is composition: for M, N, P terms and x = y, we have that ( Beside using axioms ext_tm and unsat, the proof of this property goes by structural induction over the structure of P ; thus we need to assume the corresponding induction principle on Var->Var->tm:
A The Calculus of Inductive Constructions [8, 18, 19] . In an LF, following the "judgment-as-types" paradigm, we can represent faithfully and uniformly all the relevant concepts of the inferential process in a logical system (syntactic categories, terms, variables, contexts, assertions, axiom schemata, rule schemata, instantiation, tactics, etc.).
The Calculus of Inductive Constructions (implemented in the Coq system where [n:nat] is Gallina notation for abstraction λn : nat. Using these elimination schemata, Coq automatically states and proves the induction principle for each inductively defined type. For instance, the above definition yields the Peano induction principle "for free":
where (n:nat) is the notation for dependent product n:nat . This feature has been extensively used in the definition of logical connectives: we need only to specify the introduction rules, and we can prove the elimination rules from the elimination principle the system automatically provides us. However, allowing for any inductive definition in CIC would yield nonnormalizing terms, thus invalidating the standard proof of consistency of the system. Hence, inductive definitions are subject to the positivity condition, which (roughly) requires that the type we are defining does not occur in negative position in the type of any argument of any constructor. This condition ensures the soundness of the system, but it rules out also many sound inductive definitions. For instance, the following definition of λ-terms in (full) higher-order abstract syntax
is not well-formed, due to the negative occurrence of L in the type L->L of the argument of lam.
Another problem arising from the use of higher order abstract syntax together with inductive types is that of exotic terms. These are λ-terms which do not correspond to any object "on the paper", despite their types correspond to some syntactic category. Exotic terms are generated when a type has a higher-order constructor over an inductive type. A simple example is the following fragment of first-order logic: The term weird does not correspond to any proposition of first order logic: there is no formula ∀xφ such that φ{0/x} and φ{1/x} are syntactically equal to "ff " and "0 = 0", respectively. Exotic terms are problematic in establishing the faithfulness of the formalization; usually, they have to be ruled out by means of auxiliary "validity" judgments [5, 20] . Another approach, which we have used in this paper, is to have the higher order constructors to range over types which are not inductive, so that there is no Cases to use as above.
A common implementation of CIC is Coq, an interactive proof assistant developed by the INRIA and other institutes. For a complete description, we refer to [13] . Coq is an editor for interactively searching for an inhabitant of a type, in a top-down fashion by applying tactics step-by-step, backtracking if needed, and for verifying correctness of typing judgments. A proof search starts by entering
where goal is the type representing the proposition to prove. At this point, Coq waits for commands from the user, in order to build the proof term which inhabits goal (i.e., the proof). To this end, Coq offers a rich set of tactics, e.g., introduction and application of assumptions, application of rules and previously proved lemmata, elimination of inductive objects, inversion of (co)inductive hypotheses and so on. These tactics allow the user to proceed in his proof search much like he would do informally. At every step, the type checking algorithm ensures the soundness of the proof. When the proof term is completed, it can be saved (by the command Qed) for future applications. 
B The Theory of Contexts
For the sake of completeness in Figure B .1 we list the properties of the Theory of Contexts in full generality, i.e., without sticking to a particular logical framework and/or encoding. Then we resume the instantiations we used in the formal development outlined throughout the paper. 
B.1 Axioms for the first case study (α-equivalence)
